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Abstract: The majority of computer systems employ a login ID and password 
as the principal method for access security. In stand-alone situations, this level 
of security may be adequate, but when computers are connected to the  
internet, the vulnerability to a security breach is increased. In order to reduce 
vulnerability to attack, biometric solutions have been employed. In this  
paper, we investigate the use of a behavioural biometric based on keystroke 
dynamics. Although there are several implementations of keystroke  
dynamics available – their effectiveness is variable and dependent on the  
data sample and its acquisition methodology. The results from this study 
indicate that the Equal Error Rate (EER) is significantly influenced by the 
attribute selection process and to a lesser extent on the authentication algorithm 
employed. Our results also provide evidence that a Probabilistic Neural 
Network (PNN) can be superior in terms of reduced training time and 
classification accuracy when compared with a typical MLFN back-propagation 
trained neural network. 
Keywords: biometrics; equal error rate; EER; keystroke dynamics; 
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1 Introduction 
User access to most computer systems is secured through possession of a login ID and 
password combination (i.e. C2 security level). Once the login details have been exposed 
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to an unauthorised user – they have complete access to the computer system in a 
transparent manner/such security breaches may result in direct financial loss and 
information security leaks. Such breaches produce an increased perception of the 
vulnerability of computer systems as portals for computer based transactions.  
This apprehension is exacerbated when transactions occur in a publicly accessible 
medium such as the internet. In response to public awareness of perceived and real 
threats, researchers in academia and industry alike have sought ways to enhance 
computer security. These research efforts have spawned a new industry – with the sole 
purpose of providing solutions to enhance computer security – the biometrics industry. 
Currently, there are two major forms of biometrics: those based on physiological 
attributes and those based on behavioural attributes (this of course excludes ID cards and 
what-we-possess mechanisms). Physiological biometrics integrate a measurement of 
some physiological feature such as fingerprints, retinal blood vessel patterns and iris 
patterns into an automated authentication schema. Behavioural biometrics on the other 
hand extract and integrate information about human behaviour such as variations in our 
speech pattern, gait, signature and the way we type into the authentication schema  
(see Jain and Sharath, 2003; Peacock, 2004). 
Each major class of biometrics has their pros and cons. Physiological biometrics is 
generally considered/perceived to be extremely robust and hence more secure.  
For instance, we each possess unique fingerprints (even identical twins differ in their 
fingerprint patterns) and such measures of identity are thought to be foolproof.  
But current literature reports indicate that fingerprints can be spoofed (Jain and Sharath, 
2003; Peacock, 2004). In addition, even though fingerprint scanners are becoming more 
reliable and cheaper to acquire, they still are subject to noise and wear and tear. They 
require replacement approximately once a year and are difficult to deploy on remote 
access systems, such as a home computer used in a credit card transaction over the 
internet. Iris scanners and more noise tolerant and are highly accurate, but are certainly 
more expensive than fingerprint scanners. In addition, they are (or at least appear to be) 
more intrusive – a very important factor in a biometric. Any biometric solution that is to 
be used on the internet (and therefore accessed by potentially 100s of millions of users) 
must be effective and yet very unobtrusive. Behavioural biometrics on the other hand are 
unobtrusive – but are considered/perceived to be more fallible than physiological 
techniques. Signatures can be forged, speech can be replicated through moderately 
sophisticated speech synthesis machinery, etc. Which class of biometrics one selects  
will depend on the need at hand. It is the contention in this, paper that behavioural 
biometrics – and keystroke dynamics in particular affords a high level of security – on 
par with fingerprint systems – without compromising usability and the need for 
expensive hardware. 
2 Keystroke dynamics 
Keystroke dynamics is a class of behavioural biometrics that captures the typing style of 
a user. Typing style includes such factors as the length of time it takes to type the login 
id/password, how long we depress a key and how long we take to type successive keys. 
Figure 1 illustrates the classic example of the data that can be extracted by entering 
two keys on a standard keyboard. By collecting all possible digraphs (two-letter 
combinations) from the login Id/password – one can develop a model of how the person 
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types these credentials for example. In addition to this static information, one can 
investigate how a person’s typing style evolves with continued practice. This practice 
effect – or learning curve – can be quantified and used as a metric directly. In addition, 
any attributes collected for the authentication process must be updated over time.  
In addition to the static direct attributes mentioned above – secondary or derived 
attributes should be acquired. These include typing speed, edit distance and entropy to 
name a few. These attributes provide at the very least an additional range of attributes 
that can be used in the classification process. In addition, they may provide useful 
classification information not found in primary attributes. We provide information on the 
role of primary and secondary attributes in the authentication process later in this paper. 
In addition to the attributes one collects, there must be some objective function that can 
be used to measure the accuracy of the authentication process. 
Figure 1 The concept of a digraph – and the various combinations that can be extracted and used 
for biometric authentication. In this particular example, the digraph is based on the 
character sequence ‘no’. Note that the subscript ‘r’ = indicates release and the subscript 
‘p’ = press 
 
Source: Peacock (2000). 
In the biometrics literature – there are two primary objective metrics used to quantify the 
efficacy of the authentication process: False Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance 
Rate (FAR). The former is usually reported as a measure of false rejection – a  
type I error and the later a false acceptance or type II error. Another measure – called the  
Cross-over Error Rate (CER) – sometimes referred to as the Equal Error Rate (EER) is 
also reported – they provide a measure of how sensitive the biometric is at balancing ease 
of use for the authentic user while at the same time reducing the imposter access rate. All 
extant biometric systems yield a trade-off between these two measures – those that reject 
imposters effectively (low FAR) are usually accompanied by a high FRR and vice versa. 
Figure 2 depicts a typical plot of FAR/FRR and indicates the CER point – where the two 
plots intersect. With the attributes at hand – and suitable metrics for quantifying the error 
level in the authentication process, the last phase entails developing the operational 
aspects of the authentication process. In most behavioural based biometrics – this is a 
two-stage process involving an enrollment process and a subsequent authentication 
process. 
Enrollment is the process whereby users are asked to present their login details 
repeatedly in order for the system to be able to extract a statistically significant sample of 
the users typing style. In the background of course the biometric system is extracting 
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both primary and secondary attributes to be used in the authentication stage. There are 
several different methodologies employed in the enrollment process. Some require 
entering a string of text of at least 400–1500 characters, depending on the required level 
of security (http://www.psylock.com). Others require that a user enter their login 
ID/password multiple times (typically 10–15) such as the case with the commercial 
product Biopassword (http://www.biopassword.com). Lastly, some methods employ a 
combination of both strategies: with an initial Biopassword like enrollment followed by 
subsequent monitoring of keystrokes at periodic intervals. Whichever method is 
employed, a fine balance has to be achieved during the enrollment procedure. If it is too 
lengthy, then users will consider it a nuisance and if it is too short, will result in a 
classifier with reduced accuracy. Many surveyed users (personal observations) claim that 
periodic checking of their typing style is obtrusive and considered as an unacceptable 
invasion of their privacy. 
Table 1 commonly reported attributes collected during and/or generated from the 
enrollment process. 
Figure 2 The CER is indicated as the intersection between the FAR and FRR – when  
measured against a changing threshold 
 
Table 1 Summary of the attributes that were extracted from both enrollment and 
authentication attempts 
Digraphs 10–28 nodes 
Trigraphs 8–12 nodes 
Total username time (∗) 1 node 
Total password time (∗) 1 node 
Total entry time (∗) 1 node 
Speed 1 node 
Scan code (∗) 1 node 
Edit distance 1 node 
Note: 
1 The attributes were utilised both in the PNN and the back-propagation neural network 
authenticators. 
2 All time related attributes are recorded in milliseconds with an accuracy of ±1 mS. 
Items in the first column with an ‘∗’ are considered primary attributes in this work. 
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Once this data has been collected, a reference ‘signature’ is obtained for this user.  
The reference is then used on subsequent login attempts – a user with that particular 
login id/password combination has their keystroke dynamics extracted and then 
compared with a stored reference value. If they are within a prescribed tolerance  
limit – the user is authenticated. If not – then the system can decide whether to lock up 
the workstation – or take some other suitable action. When devising such a biometric 
solution – there is always a trade – off between being overly stringent – rejecting every 
attempt to login in and being overly lenient – allowing imposters to access the computer. 
This balance is reflected in the resultant EER from pilot studies and is used to help tweak 
the system appropriately. How this is done is still a key research area in biometrics. 
In order to evaluate keystroke dynamics as a suitable methodology for user 
authentication, the following questions must be addressed: 
1 what attributes can be extracted from the user based on their typing styles and 
2 what authentication algorithm(s) can be employed to maximise subtle 
differences between the typing styles of individuals. 
The first question is intimately associated with the individuality of typing – is it as 
unique as a fingerprint for instance? In order to address this issue, one must examine the 
various attributes that can be extracted (with appropriate accuracy) from the typing 
pattern of a user. These attributes are the summation of a number of unique 
measurements which are recorded when a user types. For instance, how quickly they 
type, the duration of keypresses (dwell time), the latency between successive keypresses 
(time of flight), the keypress ordering, their usage of the shift keys and how their typing 
style evolves with practise – referred to as a practise effect (Card et al., 1980). These 
attributes must be collected for each user and stored for future use in the authentication 
process. In order to acquire a sufficient sample size for each the attributes, most 
keystroke based biometric systems require an initial enrollment phase. 
With the enrollment data in hand, one can build a model of the typing style of a given 
user. The parameters of this model then become the inputs to a given classifier. 
Extracting the correct parameters is undoubtedly the critical issue with regards to 
keystroke dynamics based biometrics. What information can be extracted from typing? 
Table 1 lists the major attributes that have been reported in the literature in the context of 
keystroke dynamics (see Jain and Sharath, 2003; Obaidat and Macchairolo, 1994; 
Peacock, 2000). The attributes are generally collected during some form of enrollment 
process. The attributes can be categorised into primary and derived attributes.  
By primary, we refer to attributes such as duration, latency and scan code – attributes that 
can be extracted while the user is typing. From this set of primary attributes, we can 
derive a variety of second order attributes such as digraph/trigraph latencies, entropy and 
edit distance and speed (Bergadano et al., 2002; Leggett et al., 1991; Magalhães and 
Santos, 2005; Mahar et al., 1995; Obaidat and Sadoun, 1997b). The choice of attributes 
is an active area of research and we present some results on this issue in this paper. Once 
a suitable choice of attributes has been selected, a model is generated and the 
classification task is performed. It should be noted that most biometric systems 
employing keystroke dynamics, the classification task is reduced to one of  
authentication – a much simpler task than identification. There are a number of reported 
authentication algorithms that have been employed in keystroke dynamics. In the next 
section we provide a survey of the major research efforts which have focused on 
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authentication algorithms. Lastly, we describe our approach and present some data that 
indicate the Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) approach to keystroke dynamics based 
authentication is indeed a reasonable one. 
2.1 Classification algorithms 
In the context of keystroke dynamics based security enhancement, the classification 
algorithm is really an authentication algorithm. It is usually described as a 1:1 mapping. 
A table of some sort is maintained that contains a user’s details along with associated 
discrimination data collected during the enrollment process. When those access details 
are entered, the system looks up the respective details and performs a similarity measure 
of some sort. Identification is not prevalent in this domain primarily because of the 
possible time lag that might be involved if this system were deployed for a large number 
of users. Therefore, classification is synonymous with authentication in this present 
paper. Another important issue in keystroke dynamics based authentication algorithms is 
whether one has both legitimate and imposter data available. If the classification method 
is supervised, then the system must be trained on legitimate and imposter data samples 
where does one acquire imposter data? There are a couple of solutions to this problem. 
One solution is to select a random set of legitimate data samples and add a variable 
amount of noise. This will produce two sets of training data that can be used to train a 
supervised authentication scheme such neural network paradigms (MLFNs) trained with 
backpropagation. These issues will be discussed in turn as we enumerate some of the 
major research efforts in this domain next. 
In Gaines et al. (1980) presented a report of his work to study the typing patterns of 
seven professional typists. The small number of volunteers and the fact that the algorithm 
is deduced from their data and not tested in other people later, results on a lower 
confidence on the FAR and FRR values presented. But the method used to establish a 
pattern was a breakthrough: a study of the time spent to type the same two letters 
(digraph), when together in the text. Since then, many algorithms based on Algebra and 
on Probability and Statistics have been presented. Joyce and Gupta (1990) presented in 
1990  an algorithm to calculate a value that represents the distance between acquired 
keystroke latency times and correspondent times previously stored. In Monrose and 
Rubin (1997) use the Euclidean Distance and probabilistic calculations based on the 
assumption that the latency times for one-digraph exhibits a Normal Distribution. Later, 
in 2000, they also present an algorithm for identification, based on the similarity models 
of Bayes and in 2001 they present an algorithm that uses polynomials and vector spaces 
to generate complex passwords from a simple one, using the keystroke pattern  
(Monrose et al., 2001). 
Various fuzzy logic algorithms have been applied – mapping the variability in ones 
typing patterns to a fuzzy concept. For instance, Hussien et al. (1989) and de Ru and 
Eloff (1997) use a combination of fuzzy clustering algorithms – obtaining an error rate of 
approximately 5–10% – depending on the number of samples they acquired per login 
Id/password combination. Another study (Tapiador and Siguenza, 1999) employed a 
fuzzy rule set in order to classify login Id/password combinations with somewhat better 
success than Hussein – although they report only their preliminary results. 
Techniques based on neural networks have been explored – focusing on ART-2 and 
multilayer perceptrons trained with the backpropagation algorithm. For instance, Obaidat 
provides data that suggests that the error rate can be reduced to approximately 2.4–4.2%, 
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depending on the exact preprocessing performed using a non-standard neural network 
(Obaidat and Sadoun, 1997a), has also applied neural networks (using standard 
backpropagation) to keystroke dynamics, generating error rates on the order of 2–4% 
(Bleha et al., 2002; Brown and Rogers, 1993). 
Other machine learning approaches, based on Support Vector Machines (SVM) have 
been used to address the classification problem presented by keystroke dynamics.  
de Oliveira et al. (2005), Sang et al. (2004) and Sung and Cho (2006) have applied SVM 
to a small keystroke dataset and compare their results to standard neural network 
technology. The authors claim that the SVM classifier is more efficient and at least as 
accurate as neural network technologies, have also applied SVM to this domain, 
reporting an error rate of approximately 8–10% (Sung and Cho, 2006). 
Lastly, Revett et al. have used the rough sets induction algorithm to extract rules that 
form models for predicting the validity of a login Id/password attempt (Revett et al., 
2005b). The results indicate that the error rate can be as low as 2–4% in many cases. 
There is a substantial body of literature accruing focused on the use of graphical 
based authentication schemes (see Davis et al., 2004; Jermyn et al., 1999). Although the 
results look fairly promising, we will not discuss this research stream in this paper.  
It should be noted though that the approach taken in this paper does not preclude  
using graphical authentication derived attributes – and research in this direction is 
already underway. 
The algorithms cited are a small example of the many approaches used to find 
adequate keystroke dynamics algorithms with a reasonable CER. Many others could also 
be cited, all with different evaluation methods, different number of subjects, different 
number of keystrokes required to enroll the system and different number of repetitive 
operations required to authenticate and/or identify the user. This diversity in the 
algorithm parameters and in the evaluation method makes the task of comparing their 
results a very difficult one. Furthermore, there is, in this subject, no concept of what is a 
representative data sample. The same algorithm presents different results when tested 
with different volunteer groups (datasets). The best way to meaningfully compare two 
algorithms is to test it against the same group. 
In this study, we have deployed the use of a PNN as the authentication technique. 
The reason for this is that we have some expertise in this area (Gorunescu et al., 2005a,b; 
Revett et al., 2005b) and that it is a novel approach to the problem. To our knowledge, no 
other author(s) have employed a PNN to this domain. A PNN operates in a supervised 
fashion – so we collected data with respect to FRR and FAR. The details of the data 
collection are described in the methods section. We also compared our results with that 
obtained by using a standard three layer MLP and the vanilla back-propagation 
algorithm. Another justification for applying a PNN to this domain is the efficiency of 
training relative to a back-propagation based NN. Consider the deployment of a 
keystroke dynamics based authentication system on the internet. One would expect that 
users will be added to the system constantly – if you are using standard backprop – the 
training time will increase almost exponentially. With PNN however – training time is 
minimised – provided the system has sufficient memory to house all objects in  
memory. Lastly, we used the authentication algorithm we have developed to examine  
the relative importance of the attributes that are collected during enrollment and 
subsequent data processing. We present this data after a brief discussion of the  
PNN algorithm. 
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2.2 Probabilistic neural networks 
The PNN is essentially a classifier implemented as a neural network version of a  
Bayes-Parzen classifier (Specht, 1988, 1990). The general classification problem is to 
determine the category membership of a multivariate sample data (i.e. a p-dimensional 
random vector x) into one of q possible groups Ωi, i = 1, 2,…, q, based on a set of 
measurements. If we know the probability density functions (p.d.f.) fi(x), usually the 
Parzen-Cacoulos or Parzen like p.d.f. classifiers: 
2
/ 2 2
1
1 1( ) exp(2 ) 2
im j
i p p
ji
x xf x
mπ σ σ=
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑  (1) 
the a priori probabilities hi = P(Ωi) of occurrence of patterns from categories Ωi and the 
loss (or cost) parameters li associated with all incorrect decisions given Ω = Ωi, then, 
according to the Bayesian decision rule, we classify x into the category Ωi if the 
inequality li hi fi(x) > lj hj fj(x) holds true. The standard training procedure for PNN 
requires a single pass over all the training patterns, giving them the advantage of being 
faster than the feed-forward neural networks (Specht, 1988, 1990). 
Basically, the architecture of PNN is limited to three layers: the input/pattern layer, 
the summation layer and the output layer. Each input/pattern node forms a product of the 
input pattern vector x with a weight vector Wi and then perform a non-linear operation, 
that is 2exp[ ( ) ( ) /(2 )]i iW x W xτ σ− − −  (assuming that both x and Wi are normalised to 
unit length), before outputting its activation level to the summation node. Each 
summation node receives the outputs from the input/pattern nodes associated  
with a given class and simply sums the inputs from the pattern units that  
correspond to the category from which the training pattern was selected, 
2exp[ ( ) ( ) /(2 )].i ii W x W xτ σ− − −∑  The output nodes produce binary outputs by using the 
inequality: 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )2 2exp exp2 2j ji ii j
W x W xW x W x
ττ
σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ − − −− − − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ > ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑  (2) 
related to two different categories Ωi and Ωj. 
The key to obtaining a good classification using PNN is to optimally estimate  
the two parameters of the Bayes decision rule, the misclassification costs and  
the prior probabilities. In our practical experiment we have estimate them heuristically. 
Thus, as concerns the costs parameters, we have considered them depending on the 
average distances Di, inversely proportional, that is li = 1/Di. As concerns the prior 
probabilities, they measure the membership probability in each group and thus, we have 
considered them equal to each group size, that is hi = mi. As in our previous work,  
we employed an evolutionary technique based on the genetic algorithm to find the 
smoothing parameters (see Gorunescu et al., 2005a,b for implementation details).  
In the next section, we describe the experimental methods, with a brief description of  
the dataset. 
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3 Methods 
The dataset we examined consisted of a group of 50 subjects (all university students in a 
computer science department) – 20 acting as authentic users and the balance (30) acting 
as imposters. We asked the authentic user group to enter a login Id/password of their 
choice (minimum of 6 characters each, with a maximum limit of 15 characters for each). 
This was immediately followed by an enrollment period that consisted of entering their 
selected user Id/password for ten trials. We collected a series of attributes (see Table 1 
for a complete listing) which were to be used during the authentication process. The data 
samples were collected over a 14–day period, throughout specified periods of the day. 
We requested that the participants login during a morning, midday and late afternoon 
session in order to replicate the average login times during the course of a  
normal working day. We maintained a running average of the primary and derived 
attributes – where the oldest sample of ten was replaced and all derived attributes were 
recalculated. We invited the imposter group (30 participants) to ‘hack’ into all of the 
legitimate accounts after providing them with the account holders’ login Id/passwords. 
They were given 1 week to log into all 20 authentic accounts approximately 100 times 
each (total of 2000 attempts) and the success/failure rates were recorded. More 
specifically, each participant of the imposter group attacked each account four  
times – for a total of 80 login attempts for each imposter. Therefore, each account will be 
attacked 120 times. We randomly selected 100 imposter login attempts for each account 
and used these values in all subsequent calculations in order to keep the numbers in 
multiples of 100. This was used to estimate the average FAR for the user group.  
In addition, the authentic users were asked to log into their own accounts 100 times 
during the same period. This data was to be used for estimating the average FRR for the 
user group. The resultant data will contain 2000 FRR attempts and 2000 imposter login 
attempts. We then used this data to train our PNN algorithm to perform the required class 
discrimination task. We cross-validated our results and we report the average results 
from these experiments. The particular version of the PNN we employed in this paper 
was the same as that employed in previous work (Gorunescu et al., 2005a,b; Revett et al., 
2005b). We also applied a modified version of our PNN algorithm, that used separate 
smoothing factors for each class (authentic and imposter). We report both results in this 
work – and found that using a separate smoothing factor provided consistently better 
classification results. To provide a direct comparison of the PNN results with another 
recognised classification technique, we developed a three layer multilayer perceptron 
neural network trained with back-propagation. The following parameters were used for 
the MLFN the input layer was contained the minimal number of nodes 23, the hidden 
layer had 14 nodes and the output layer 2 nodes (corresponding to the two decision 
classes). Please note the actual number of potential input nodes really ranges from  
23 to 45 in this particular dataset. We therefore used the minimal number of digraphs 
(10) and trigraphs (8) as per Table 2. The learning parameter η = 0.2 without a 
momentum term. The acceptable error rate was set to 0.01. The actual data (extracted 
attributes) that was presented to both authentication systems is summarised in Table 2. 
Note the difficulty one encounters when using a fixed architecture like an MLP when the 
number of digraphs varies as is the case with a variable length user Id/password. The 
results were assessed using 10-fold cross validation and the results presented in this 
paper are the average values for each network (PNN or BP). 
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Table 2 FAR/FRR values as a function of the division level 
Division points False acceptance False rejection 
Panel A 
10 0.0483 0.0481 
20 0.0192 0.0197 
30 0.0576 0.0376 
40 0.0576 0.0566 
50 0.0576 0.0483 
60 0.0001 0.0021 
70 0.0576 0.0598 
80 0.0481 0.0483 
90 0.0288 0.0312 
100 0.0480 0.0427 
 0.0422 0.0394 
Panel B 
10 0.0583 0.0481 
20 0.0692 0.0997 
30 0.0976 0.0876 
40 0.0741 0.0566 
50 0.0716 0.0983 
60 0.0411 0.0521 
70 0.0576 0.0598 
80 0.0481 0.0483 
90 0.0588 0.0912 
100 0.0638 0.0727 
 0.06402 0.07144 
Note: The values in the last row of the right-most columns are the averages of their 
respective columns. In Panel A, the results were obtained using a different 
smoothing factor for training/testing and Panel B using the same smoothing  
factor for each. 
In addition to the classification task per se, we also sought to investigate the information 
content of each of the attributes that were acquired during the enrollment phase.  
We therefore tested a variety of combination of attributes (see Table 4 for a summary of 
the collected attributes). The digraphs were recorded during as the time in mS between 
the release of two successive keystrokes, with an accuracy of 1 mS. The trigraphs were 
recorded in the same way, based on the release time between the first and third keys. The 
speed was measured as the total time taken to enter the login ID and password divided by 
the total number of characters, excluding the return key and the interval between entering 
the login ID and password. The edit distance was recorded as per (Bergadano et al., 
2002) using trigraphs only. Briefly, the edit distance is an indication of the entropy 
different between two typing samples. The trigraphs entered which span across the login 
ID/password boundary, are arranged in order of ascending order of time. Then the 
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number of rearrangements required to order the trigraphs is measured and divided by the 
total number of trigraphs that are available for a string of a given length. The specific 
details of which attributes and their combinations that were tested is described in detail in 
the results section. These attribute combinations were used for classification purposes 
with both versions of the PNN and the MLFN as indicated. The result of these 
experiments is presented in the next section. 
4 Results 
We first describe an experiment where we examined which division used in the PNN and 
whether a single or separate smoothing factor gave us the best classification accuracy. 
For this experiment, we used the full set of attributes (see Table 4 for details).  
We selected random samples for training and testing (50/50 in this case) and applied our 
PNN algorithm to these random samples. More specifically, we selected 200 samples of 
FAR and FRR data for the training/testing purposes, repeating this process until all 
samples were utilised (10 trials). The data in Tables 2 indicate that the classification 
accuracy was essentially independent on the number of divisions employed for this 
dataset. Please note that the modified PNN algorithm (separate smoothing factors for 
each category) yielded consistently higher results than one that employed the same 
smoothing factor for both classes. 
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that our FAR/FRR is on the order of  
4% – and the data in Table 4 indicate a slightly higher error rate of approximately 6.8% 
(sum of the FAR and FRR errors) for the MLFN. 
Table 3 Summary of the authentication accuracy using the back-propagation algorithm 
summarised as a series of confusion matrices 
Trial 1 Legit Impost  
Legit 89 11 0.89 
Impost 10 90 0.90 
 0.89 0.89 0.895 
Trial 2    
Legit 93 7 0.93 
Impost 8 92 0.92 
 0.92 0.93 0.925 
Trial 3    
Legit 91 9 0.91 
Impost 7 93 0.93 
 0.93 0.91 0.920 
Note: 
1 The values in the right hand column (in italics) are the accuracy for the particular 
classification run. 
2 ‘Legit’ is short for legitimate and ‘impost’ is short for imposter. 
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We also investigated the ability of a multilayered neural network running the  
back-propagation learning algorithm on the data that was collected and previously 
analysed with the PNN algorithm. The data extracted from the user input was 
summarised in Table 1. The dataset was sampled 50/50 training/testing and repeated 
using n-fold validation and the results are reported as the average values. The data for the 
MLFN classification experiment is presented as in Table 3. Note that the same set of 
subsamples was used in both experiments. Note that the average accuracy from the 
samples in Table 3 yield a value of approximately 91%. This value is approximately  
the same for the average from resampling the entire dataset without replacement 
(92.1%). We then repeated the comparison experiments (using the dual smoothing 
factors only for the PNN) but varied the particular attributes that were used. In particular, 
we were interested in what effect the various attributes contributed towards the 
classification accuracy and whether the particular classification technique would be 
differentially influenced by the attribute selection process. Table 4 presents a summary of 
the various attributes that were tested, along with the classification accuracy (reported as 
the average of the FRR/FAR results) for the PNN and the MLFN, both trained as per the 
previous results. 
Table 4 Summary of the classification accuracy for the PNN and MLFN classifiers when 
using various combinations of primary and/or derived attributes, values are the  
sum of the FAR and FRR results 
Attributes PNN (%) MLFN (%) 
All 3.9 5.7 
Primary only 5.2 6.5 
Derived only 4.2 6.2 
DG + primary 4.4 5.3 
TG + primary 4.0 5.8 
Edit distance only 3.7 5.0 
Note: See Table 1 for details on which are primary and derived attributes. 
Finally, there is the issue of computational time – both for training and the classification 
tasks. Generally speaking, the PNN training time was significantly lower than that for the 
MLFN – 1.4 min versus 5.6 min for training on 400 objects – 200 for each class.  
The classification task was approximately the same for each classifier – with an average 
value of 8 sec. 
5 Conclusions 
We have successfully applied our modified Specht PNN to difficult biomedical datasets 
and have obtained accuracy levels comparable to other more traditional methods 
(Gorunescu et al., 2005a,b; Revett et al., 2005a,b). In this study, we have employed our 
modified PNN to a small dataset of login Id/password samples. The modified classifier 
performed better than the standard PNN algorithm by a considerable margin (4% versus 
8% approximately). These results are comparable to traditional neural network 
approaches as well as more ‘modern’ approaches such as SVM. We also used the same 
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dataset to test the classification accuracy of standard implementation of the MLFN 
trained with backpropagation. The results from this study indicate that the PNN is 
superior to the MLFN with respect to the classification accuracy and training time.  
It must be noted that these results were obtained without any data preprocessing.  
We simply collected the data, selected a random subset for training 50% and 50% for 
testing. This algorithm is time efficient when login id/password credentials are used for 
authentication purposes. It is a well known fact that the training phase of the PNN 
algorithm begins to degrade in terms of time efficiency when the sample numbers are 
large. But in this area of application, where we have a relatively small number of samples 
for training (on the order of 100–200) – and can select an equal number of testing 
samples, training performance is not an issue. This is in contrast to other techniques such 
as the backpropagation algorithm that requires a substantial number of training data in 
order to generate accurate classification. These advantages make the PNN a very suitable 
candidate for a novel machine learning algorithm in the context of keystroke dynamics 
authentication. 
With regards to the attribute used in this study we found that the derived attributes 
such as digraph/trigraph times, speed and edit distance were more effective compared to 
primary attributes such as dwell time, time of flight and scan codes. The edit distance 
attribute produced results with the lowest error rate for both the PNN and MLFN. 
Although not statistically different from using all attributes – the data from this study 
suggest that this attribute is quite important in the classification task when using these 
types of classifiers. This data is consistent with the results published by Bergadano. 
Clearly there is a trend in the results from this study to investigate a variety of first and 
second order attributes before selecting a classifier tool. Not all attributes produce the 
same classification accuracy over different techniques. 
Another aspect of keystroke dynamics based biometrics entails how to collect 
samples for classification. In this study, we attempted to collect data from users in a 
manner consistent with normal daily computer usage. It may be fairly unrealistic to ask 
imposters to hack into a system for 100 consecutive attempts. Most computer systems 
turn of access opportunities after three failed login attempts – so attempting 100 is an 
unreasonable situation. In addition, when does one count a login attempt as a failure? Is it 
after three continuously failed attempts or after each single failed attempt? In this  
study – we used single failed attempts. If one counts only three failed attempts before 
considering the attempt as a failure – then both FAR/FRR rates will be significantly 
different from what we report. As long as the author makes it clear what their criterion  
is – then different laboratories can meaningfully compare their results. 
This preliminary study has yielded promising results with respect to the use of a PNN 
for keystroke dynamics based authentication. One advantage of the PNN is that it can 
work with missing and mixed datasets. The amount of preprocessing required is minimal 
which is critical with a system that must be automated and work in an online basis.  
We will continue to variations on the PNN architecture as originally proposed by Specht. 
In particular, hybrid systems employing evolutionary techniques may enhance the 
classification accuracy through the discovery of better parameters for the model 
(Gorunescu et al., 2005a). In addition, further variations and combinations in attribute 
selection may enhance the classification performance as well. Finally, the results of this 
work provide another example of how behavioural biometrics can produce an accurate 
authentication system that is both robust with respect to the parameter selection process, 
while maintaining the usability advantage over current physiological based biometrics. 
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